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A set of motives to unite them all? Revisiting the principles and typology of 
internationalization motives 
 
Introduction 
This debate forum in Multinational Business Review derives in part from a special session at 
the 2013 Reading-UNCTAD conference, where we asked the panelists to answer the 
question, “Does the classification of multinational enterprises (MNEs) motives still make 
sense?” As with all academic enquiries, there was no obvious and simple response. Indeed, as 
the discussion we held then and as the contributors to this forum note, there has been a wide 
variety of motives and classification schemes proposed over the years.  
 
Given that the Reading conferences (and a good number of the participants) demonstrate a 
bias towards atheoretical approaches associated with the ‘Reading School’, there was a 
natural drift towards redefining the question as: ‘Dunning’s classification of motives: Do we 
need to revisit it?’ One would think that this gives a clear and fairly concrete mandate for 
discussion, but as van Tulder (2015, in this issue) observes, although Dunning’s view is now 
almost paradigmatic, his opinion of the ‘main’ motives changed over time. Dunning offered a 
much more comprehensive list (Dunning, 1993), before emphasizing the now much-cited 
four ‘seeking’ motives (market-, resource-, factor- and strategic asset-seeking) (Dunning, 
1993; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Although his prior work included other motives (e.g., 
bandwagon effects, escape investments, passive investments, support investments, trade-
supportive investments…), these other motives became regarded as being of secondary value; 
they are not even mentioned in much of the subsequent analyses of motives by other scholars.  
 
Of course, there are alternative classifications of internationalization motives (see Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2015 in this issue; van Tulder, 2015 in this issue). That the wider academic 
community can come up with several different alternative classifications (to which this 
 
 
debate forum contributes yet more) leads to several questions: Why are there so many 
options, and why has the field of international business largely chosen to adopt a simple four-
way classification? Why had Dunning decided to emphasize four instead of a dozen? Had the 
world become simpler with time, and had the activities and strategies of MNEs become more 
homogenous, that just four motives sufficed for most of our analytical needs? Do these four 
primary internationalization motives still meet our needs? 
 
The genesis of internationalization motives and the need for extending them 
It is always useful to step back and consider the setting in which these questions were first 
asked and answered, and to understand the context in which earlier generations of 
international business (IB) scholars addressed them. Dunning’s internationalization motives – 
whichever version you prefer – were not intended as a stand-alone theoretical device, but as 
an appendage to the internationalization literature, and specifically towards understanding the 
behavior not of MNEs in general, but of their foreign direct investment (FDI) activities in 
particular (Benito, 2015 in this issue). That is it to say, Dunning answered the question: what 
are their motives to undertake fully-internal production in a foreign location? Note that 
Dunning’s work intentionally referred to ‘production’ and not ‘activities’, because the initial 
novelty of FDI (as opposed to trade) was the internationalization of production.  
 
Indeed, Dunning initially used ‘motives’ and ‘types’ of foreign production as synonyms, and 
one of the earlier references [1] to these ‘types’ goes back to the Kojima-Reading School 
debate, and the various participants of that exchange of papers. Kojima (1978) referred to two 
types (motives) of FDI: import-substituting (trade-displacing) and offshore or export-
platform (trade-creating) types of investment. The popularity of the concept took off in IB at 
that point, partly as a response to his unfortunate dichotomy. A close reading of contributions 
 
 
to Pitelis and Sugden (both the 1991 and the 2000 edition) indicates a strong interest by a 
number of authors towards understanding the different types of FDI.  
 
In an earlier contribution, Dunning (1988) proposed three main motives: Market seeking 
(import substituting), Resource seeking (supply oriented), and Efficiency seeking 
(rationalized investment). Dunning (1993) offers a more complete list of motives, which we 
have listed in Table I, later largely duplicated in Dunning and Lundan (2008) (although the 
discussion on asset-seeking was revised). It is interesting to note that in Dunning (1993) there 
was considerable overlap between asset-seeking and resource-seeking. He notes that “The 
third type of resource-seeking FDI is prompted by the need of firms to acquire technological 
capability, management or marketing expertise and organizational skills” (p.57), although 
this overlap is corrected in subsequent work.  
 
The last five motives listed in Table I are classified as ‘other motives’, implying that he 
considered them to be secondary [2], and for some reason have largely been ignored by the 
IB community. However, a closer reading of these indicate that motives such as ‘escape 
investments’ are of growing importance, and studies of emerging country MNEs recognize 
that there is considerable EMNE activity promoted by the need to avoid institutional voids, a 
category that fits well with ‘escape investments’ (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014). 
Likewise, a considerable amount of FDI continues to be undertaken to maintain and support 
trade. Trade is still important, and in fact 80 per cent of all trade remains in the hands of 
MNEs. The growth of service MNE activity has surely created the need for us to pay closer 
attention to ‘finance-supportive investments’, because banks and insurance companies require 
a local presence for regulatory reasons.  
 
 
 
Table I. Updating the nine Dunning internationalization motives 
 
The 
“Nine Rings 
(motives) for 
Mortal Men” 
and their 
MNEs 
Types 
(adapted from 
Dunning, 
1993) 
Objectives/Motives (inspired by and updated  from 
Dunning, 1993) 
The 
Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 
motives (2015 
in this issue) 
1 Natur
al resource 
seeking 
To acquire particular and specific resources of a 
higher quality at a lower real cost than could be obtained in 
their home country (e.g. physical resources, un-skilled (or 
semi-skilled) labor, technological/managerial expertise, etc.)  
‘Buy 
Better’ 
2 Marke
t seeking 
To supply goods or services to a particular country 
or region (from existing markets to new markets) 
‘Sell 
More’ 
3 Effici
ency seeking 
To rationalize the structure of established resource-
based or market seeking investment in such a way that the 
investing firm can gain from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities (e.g. economies of scale 
and scope) 
‘Buy 
Better’ and 
‘Sell More’ 
4 Strate
gic asset 
seeking 
To promote long-term strategic objectives – 
especially that of sustaining or advancing global 
competitiveness (e.g. augmentation of global portfolio of 
physical assets and human competences, which they perceive 
will either sustain or strengthen their ownership-specific 
advantages or weaken those of competitors) 
‘Upgr
ade’ 
5 Escap
e investment 
To escape restrictive legislation, institutional voids, 
or macro-organizational policies by home governments (e.g. 
round-tripping investment, escaping from high levels of 
taxation or austere environmental regulation, etc.) 
‘Escap
e’ 
6 Trade-
supportive 
investment 
To promote and facilitate the exports and imports of 
goods and services from the investing (or other) firm 
‘Buy 
Better’ and 
‘Sell More’ 
7 Finan
ce-supportive 
investment 
To support and assist in the purchasing of foreign-
produced goods and services from investing (or other) firm 
To establish domicile in specific location for 
regulatory and tax reasons 
‘Buy 
Better’ and 
‘Sell More’ 
8 Mana
gement-
supportive 
investment 
To support the control and coordination function on 
behalf of MNE headquarters (e.g. regional office, branch 
offices)  
‘Upgr
ade’ 
9 Passiv
e investment 
To arbitrage by buying and selling firms or assets 
with some involvement of direct managerial inputs (e.g. 
private equity capital firm, asset stripping, etc.) 
‘Buy 
Better’ and 
‘Sell More’ 
 
 
This brief review of John Dunning’s understanding of motives indicates that the motives, like 
the rings in Tolkien’s world, can be changed, in some cases cast away, and occasionally even 
destroyed in the fires of Mount Doom if needed. Their modification is driven by a twin set of 
forces. First, technological and institutional advances in the world economy lead to new 
 
 
developments in the way in which firms organize themselves as MNEs, and the degree of 
heterogeneity of motives is by no means diminished, which leads to the need to adapt 
arguments to reality. Second, John Dunning made revisions at various points in time to his 
list of motives in response to the changes in MNE activity. These ‘picks’ – as several 
contributions in this issue of MBR note – were deductive and atheoretical. There is no reason 
to believe that the choice of ‘main’ and ‘secondary’ motives is not in need of an update. As 
the world has changed, so has the IB literature. 
 
Globalization changed the world in the last 30 years… 
The world has not stayed in the same place in the last 30 years. We live in a very different 
environment, as much-discussed in the globalization literature (see Held et al., 1999, Narula 
2003), with shrinking economic distance, lower transaction costs, and de facto economic 
integration. In a purely IB world, there are a variety of new actors from SMEs to born-
globals, and from private equity to state-controlled enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. 
There are new modes of governance where full control is exerted without ownership and 
through non-equity agreements. MNE activity is not only about FDI, because ownership is no 
longer a pre-condition for control. Thanks to bilateral and multilateral agreements, goods and 
services that were considered non-tradeables are no longer so, sectors, countries and markets 
in which MNEs were not permitted access are now available.  
 
We also have MNEs from all types of countries, from a variety of new sectors that would 
hitherto have been home-bound. The concept of nationality and identity has strayed 
considerably since Robert Reich’s stirring discussion of interdependencies and linkages in his 
article entitled, “Who is ‘Us’”(Reich 1990), and although nationalities may still matter, 
boundaries of firms and nations are porous and imprecise (Narula and Dunning, 2010). The 
 
 
world – at least from an IB perspective – has got so much more complicated that it seems 
intuitive that less should certainly not be more.  
 
Globalization has meant that – for instance, because of changes in the trade and investment 
regulatory framework in a WTO-world, as well as capabilities that allow us to coordinate 
activities more effectively – industries such as utilities, insurance and banking can expand 
abroad. Other sectors such as back-office processing, software, call centers, were rarely 
subcontracted to providers in other countries prior to the last fifteen years. These and other 
new sectors require us to think in different ways. Fast-evolving service sectors where 
customer interaction is key to their core activity are obviously more systematically engaged 
in learning as part of their raison d’être. This is what van Tulder (2015, in this issue) refers to 
as sector-intrinsic motives.  
 
However, greater heterogeneity in types of actors engaged in cross-border activities does not 
necessarily mean that there should be more internationalization motives. A good theory 
should be able to explain the behavior of economic actors; most principles of economics and 
sociology still hold; firms still seek to generate profits; companies are still faced with risks of 
internationalizing, and many still fail. 
 
…and the world of ideas changed with it 
It might seem to the younger generation of IB scholars that this is stating the obvious, but the 
context in which these ideas about motives were first broached is important for understanding 
them. The initial motives were discussed at a time of limited economic integration. In much 
of post-WWII era, and perhaps until the early 1990s, the idea of ongoing, intensive and 
sustained MNE activities was unusual. FDI was an uncommon phenomenon and served the 
 
 
purpose of enhancing trade, and indeed FDI was seen either as a substitute or a complement 
for trade (illustrated by the rather large number of studies during the 1980s and 1990s that 
asked: ‘are FDI and trade substitutes or complements?’). The idea of complex cross-border 
configurations and the MNE as an integral part of the socio-economic milieu with a variety of 
dispersed activities were more science fiction than fact. Even in the early 1990s, IB was 
associated with large MNEs with specific characteristics, such as a strong centripetal 
tendency, and single, all-powerful headquarters, and with the ability to distort markets and 
unafraid to engage in regulatory capture. MNEs came in just two flavors, European and North 
American MNEs, with the Japanese as the primary exception (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Prahalad and Doz, 1987).  
 
Time matters, because sociological, political and economic trends shift. Somewhere between 
the 1980s to the 1990s the idea that firms primarily engaged in FDI to support trade became 
passé, and within that time, the rapid expansion of Japanese and European MNEs made it 
clear that these firms were acquiring assets for reasons only secondarily associated with trade 
enhancement, and more to augment their firm-specific advantages (FSAs). Japanese MNEs 
also introduced us to the idea of transplants and the idea of multiple tiers of suppliers and 
production networks and cross-border value chains (not as yet global). Europe as an 
important political and economic bloc went from fantasy to reality, and the USSR imploded 
and the remaining countries became classified as part of the developing world. China 
becoming the largest economy in the world seemed implausible just twenty years ago.  
 
The era in which the issue of internationalization motives began to matter to IB reflects that 
this was a time where trade theory reigned supreme, and mainstream trade theory had a 
strongly neoclassical pedigree. That is to say, John Dunning (like many others) was 
 
 
addressing an audience of neo-classical economists, and that epistemic community required 
the discussion to be couched in that community of practice, and their assumptions (Narula, 
2010). Therefore, the motivations of MNEs reflected rational managers, who had access to 
plenty of information that allowed them to make fully informed economic choices. Scale 
economies were a paramount objective, and FDI reflected market imperfections; once these 
imperfections were corrected, the cause of FDI instead of trade would disappear. In short, the 
steady state was trade, and FDI was evidence of disequilibrium.  
 
Today, such assumptions seem not only rather antiquated, but also unnecessary. IB and 
economics are increasingly distant cousins, and we do not have to couch arguments in the 
prevalent economics narrative to survive the review process. Even mainstream economists 
have taken to different paradigms that do not require such restrictive assumptions. Managers 
are no longer expected to be rational (or even boundedly rational), and we do not expect that 
their decision making will be precise and prescient. We now believe that firms do not always 
maximize, because firms and their managers are not fully rational, and they cannot possibly 
have full information of all the alternatives.  
 
The IB literature has also come around to the troublesome realization that not all managers 
evaluate risk in the same way. Behavioral Economics and regulatory focus theory show us 
that managers’ experiences and attitudes towards risk vary considerably. Some individuals 
seek to minimize losses more so than maximize returns, and these play a role in their decision 
to take their firm abroad (see Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015 in this issue). Moreover, we can no 
longer assume that the same individuals will always make the same choices because 
experience with previous outcomes modifies their perspectives and decision making. Positive 
outcomes lead managers to assume that it was their prescience and ability, rather than luck or 
 
 
the environment that led to success. This leads them to undertake additional risks, and 
develop hubris, which can have nefarious consequences later on. Negative outcomes lead 
managers to become more cautious in their decisions, unless they are faced with the extreme 
situation in which they become willing to make one big bet to get out of the hole, even if such 
action sinks their company. Moreover, their experience dealing with institutions at home also 
modify their ability to deal with risk, as managers in emerging markets become accustomed 
at operating under high levels of uncertainty and develop higher flexibility and adaptability in 
decision making than their counterparts in advanced economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012).  
 
Changes in our understanding of motives 
These changes in the real world and in the world of ideas have led to a rethinking of 
internationalization motives. These include the rethinking of location advantage, intra- and 
inter-firm interactions, developmental implications and the relevance of particular motives.  
 
The importance of location advantages and the change in motives 
As Benito (2015 in this issue) notes, the ‘classic motives’ are deliberately about 
internationalization (and serve little purpose in understanding other activities of the firm). 
Decisions about internationalization mean that the reasons for a particular investment are 
associated with access (or lack thereof) of location-bound resources in the host country. 
These may be firm-specific, if they are owned by, and available exclusively to specific 
economic actors, in which case they are FSAs. They may be available in principle to all firms 
physically or legally domiciled in the host country (such as those associated with knowledge 
infrastructure, or natural resources) in which case they are location advantages (Narula and 
Santangelo, 2012).  
 
 
 
This is important, because it helps understand the differences between the strategy of a firm 
and its motivation to internationalize. It may be your strategy to do certain things, amongst 
which one may be to internationalize, but to decide on a specific location requires the logic of 
location advantages to be included in the decision. The motivation to internationalize implies 
that the MNE seeks to utilize its FSAs in conjunction with location-specific assets. A motive 
depends crucially upon the presence or absence of location advantages, and this is often lost 
in the way in which the concept of motivations is used in the literature. FSAs and location 
advantages interact, shape and influence the nature of each other in future periods (Narula, 
2012). They are not an alternative to a classification of possible strategies.  
 
The relevance of theory-driven motives 
One of the biggest problems is that motives literature may bear little relationship to reality as 
a manager might understand them. This reflects the poverty of the kinds of research tools we 
utilize to perform our field work. As van Tulder (2015 in this issue) observes, when managers 
are given a finite number of theoretically derived choices of motives, they react with 
bemusement. For a variety of reasons to do with competition and rivalry, firms are unable or 
unwilling to divulge what their true motives might be for a particular investment decision. 
Being truthful may have costs, most immediately and obviously with tax authorities or a host 
government (‘we are taking your subsidies because we are only interested in your country as 
a means to reduce our tax bill at home’), or home countries (‘we are reducing our 
employment at home unless you incentivize us to stay’).  
 
Nonetheless, decision making is rarely easily reduced to simple discrete choices. Firms have 
mixed-motives, and serially evolving motives, motives that are less important, and others that 
become more important. Firms may have multiple establishments in one location, each of 
 
 
which is engaged in different activities for different reasons. Even within a specific firm the 
various headquarters-subsidiary relationships will change over time. Some subsidiaries may 
become more strategically significant, while others become less so.  
 
However, simplicity-through-stylization is a useful tool for empirical analysis, and provides 
the average reader the tools to understand what otherwise is a study in opacity. Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. (2015 in this issue) suggest, using a theoretical lens, that the large diaspora of 
motives can be simplified into four conceptually-driven ‘envelopes’; the last column in Table 
I links these four envelopes with the nine Dunning motives.  
 
Strategic asset seeking as a motivation  
Perhaps one of the most troublesome of motives is strategic asset-seeking. Dunning’s 
definition was (intentionally) broad. It can be read either as ‘the acquisition of assets that are 
‘strategic’’, as well as ‘the seeking of assets for strategic reasons’. As we have noted earlier, 
Dunning (1993) included a broad array of what we consider to be asset-augmenting activity 
as an aspect of resource-seeking investments, since arguably technological assets are 
resources as well. As several authors in this forum note, ‘asset-seeking’ has become a ‘catch-
all’ motivation, because rare is the firm that does not want to augment its assets, or to 
improve its competitiveness. As Meyer (2015 in this issue) notes, various scholars have used 
alternative terms such as asset-augmenting to distinguish between the broad definition, and 
the precise meaning they wish the term to imbue. This lack of precision is not entirely 
accidental. Indeed, Dunning and Narula (1995) specifically (and also intentionally) used the 
concept of asset-seeking to refer only to the acquisition of technological assets through FDI 
in R&D facilities, which was different from its use in other contemporaneous publications by 
Dunning; others consider the acquisition of any kind of assets to be strategic by definition.  
 
 
 
Unfortunately, when strategic asset seeking is used in such a wide variety of ways, it 
becomes tautological – all activities are strategic in some way (rare is the manager who will 
admit that there was no strategy in a particular action!), and in the limit there is no decision 
that cannot correctly be said to be the ‘seeking of assets’ of some sort. As Benito (2015 in 
this issue) observes, asset-seeking is forward-looking (and aspirational), and more than any 
other foreign activity of an MNE, depends upon the correct appraisal of the assets of other 
external actors (Narula and Santangelo, 2012).  
 
The problems of intra-firm and inter-firm interaction and evolving motives  
Since we are now in a world where MNE, is not simply a synonym for FDI, this also requires 
us to reconsider internationalization motives. In the case of inter-firm relationships, these 
result in the existence of multiple motives within the same activity. MNEs are engaged 
abroad in intermediate forms of governance that require ongoing and interactive cooperation 
with other firm actors, whether suppliers, competitors or customers. Collaboration is a 
complex activity that requires matching and adjusting expectations and outputs of multiple 
actors. Research on collaboration indicate that more than half of all such ventures are 
considered to be failures by at least one partner (Reuer and Zollo, 2005) often because of 
what is termed ‘unfulfilled expectations’. The challenge in part is that partners have limited 
incentives to reveal their true ‘intrinsic’ motives, especially where the collaborator may suffer 
some loss by the achievement of these objectives (Narula and Martinez-Noya, 2015).  
 
In the case of intra-MNE relationships, there are differences in motives between units of the 
same MNE. It is no longer the case (or at least, we recognize now that it is not the case) that 
subsidiaries are passive extensions of the parent firm, and subservient to the will of 
 
 
headquarters. The modern MNE acts more as a federation with ‘an on-going power contest’ 
between the various units (Ambos et al., 2010) reflecting an uneasy balancing act between 
the quest for greater autonomy by the subsidiary against a centralising tendency by HQ (see 
Holm and Pedersen, 2000; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). MNEs use ‘coopetition’ to improve 
efficiency, and this means that subsidiaries can be organized in complex structures that can 
accelerate or impede knowledge flows within the MNE (Narula, 2014). It also means that the 
strategy of two subsidiaries within the same MNE can differ, and the motives of the 
headquarters in undertaking certain actions may not be implemented by the foreign subsidiary 
(Athreye et al., 2014).  
 
Motives, therefore, are always evolving, like strategies, because they are aspirational, and 
when they fail to produce the desired outcome, require a revision in motivation, if not also in 
strategy. But crucially, they are also dependent upon actors exogenous to the firm for their 
successful implementation. These actors are not passive, and also have their own motivations 
which are also evolving. Relationships are rarely equal, and this can mean that firms in a 
weaker position (such as suppliers to large MNEs) have their internationalization strategies 
dictated to them by their customers, or sometimes by their competitors. Arguably, the state of 
the MNE is still in considerable flux. A number of MNEs are organized in traditional 
hierarchies that involve FDI and wholly-owned subsidiaries, while simultaneously also being 
integrated in a complex web of non-equity relationships and interdependencies between and 
amongst a variety of other actors (Giroud and Mirza, 2015 in this issue).  
 
Developmental implications of motives 
Governments often have MNE-based development strategies that drive incentives and 
subsidies intended to achieve certain net welfare benefits. Thus, they have their own motives 
 
 
for making particular location advantages available to specific MNEs. When the two sets of 
motivations are aligned, Pareto-optimal outcomes become possible. When they differ, an 
uneasy relationship exists between the MNE and the government (Stopford and Strange, 
1992; Vernon, 1977). In addition, though, governmental development objectives change over 
time, which can result in conflict with the MNE.  
 
There is a tendency by both academics and policy makers to seek specific types of FDI, and 
for this there has been increasing reliance on FDI motives as a classification to identify 
desirable types of FDI (Narula and Dunning, 2000, 2010). While it is true that certain kinds 
of MNE activity may have greater welfare effects than others, the use of the motives 
classification as a means of judging the potential benefits of particular types of FDI can be 
misjudged. On the one hand, motives per se have no or little use in determining the relative 
merits of investments, and simply to set targets of how much ‘asset-seeking’ investment a 
country needs to attract or encourage, is to stretch the concept of normative policy to the 
extreme (as the Chinese state has begun to explicitly do; Luo et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
since motives are about the interaction of FSAs with location advantages, if the MNE’s 
investment motives are gauged accurately it is possible to evaluate the potential for 
upgrading, and the kinds of location advantages that industrial policy needs to focus on 
upgrading.  
 
Two papers in this forum focus on different aspects of policy. Pananond (2015 in this issue) 
explains how the motives of internationalization need to be rethought when analyzing 
emerging market multinationals (EMNCs). It argues that the weak position of firms and their 
integration in global value chains modify the selection of motives in several ways. First, the 
youth of EMNCs as multinationals and their limited resources as a result of the 
 
 
underdevelopment of their countries of origin result in new dynamics in the selection of 
motives. Second, the integration of EMNCs in global value chains in which firms in countries 
with low cost factors of production, such as emerging countries, internationalize initially and 
indirectly as suppliers of firms from advanced countries provides new insights into motives. 
The driver of upgrading or moving up in the value chain and the smile curve (Mudambi, 
2008) alter the usual selection of motives. The level of development of the host country plays 
an important role, because some of the entries in advanced economies are not only market but 
strategic asset seeking (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012), which may not likely happen for entries 
in other emerging markets. 
 
Giroud and Mirza (2015 in this issue) analyze the motivations for FDI under a global value 
chain (GVC) perspective, adding depth to the arguments presented by Pananond (2015 in this 
issue). They provide a broad historical evolution of the motives that highlights the role of the 
broader economy as a driver of motives, and how advances in technology and liberalization 
have facilitated this evolution of motives of advanced economy MNCs. The emergence of 
GVCs has altered our understanding of these motives, because MNEs from advanced 
economies have created the GVCs by training suppliers and subcontracting to them in other 
countries, or by telling domestic suppliers to accompany them abroad. GVCs have also been 
facilitated by improvements in the contracting environment in emerging economies and the 
general reduction of transaction costs, as well as the development of countries and increasing 
sophistication of factors of production (e.g. R&D in emerging economies is now feasible 
because of the improvement in education). This has resulted in a more nuanced understanding 
of the types of strategic asset seeking, with a distinction between the objective and the 
feasibility in achieving the objective.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
There is no logical or conceptual reason for the IB community to remain bound by the 
artificial constraint that the MNE is driven primarily by four seeking motivations, three of 
which are based on exploiting existing assets, and one that is angled towards exploration of 
assets. That these particular motives remain primary, and the others are ‘secondary’ has no 
basis in theory (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015 in this issue). Indeed the concept of 
internationalization motives is somewhat atheoretical, in the sense that – like the eclectic 
paradigm – it provides a toolkit that permits its use (or disuse) in conjunction with other 
theories and frameworks. Its value is greatest when used in conjunction with other 
frameworks. Like the eclectic paradigm, it has thrived because it allows for complex issues to 
be simplified. Like the eclectic paradigm, it suffers from being read as dogma, unchanging 
and inflexible. Its purpose, again like the eclectic paradigm, was to be a guide to providing 
order to an increasingly complex universe. Dunning’s motives were not forged as a set of 
immutable laws, by a prescient authority in the fires of Mordor: they were a function of the 
period, and reflected the background and knowledge of particular scholars, their biases and 
their preferences.  
 
To further belabor the metaphor from J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Ring saga: Should there be 
a set of motives to rule them all? The answer we propose is ‘yes’. Whether it is practical to do 
so is another matter entirely. Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2015 in this issue) propose such a 
unifying set, and for obvious reasons the authors of this paper are inclined to recommend it to 
all the races of Middle-Earth. But we recognize that it reflects the research interests and 
objectives of its authors, and provides clarity for their purposes (and those of like-minded 
scholars). Without travelling far, it is clear from the views expressed by van Tulder (2015 in 
 
 
this issue), or Giroud and Mirza (2015 in this issue), that the Cuervo-Cazurra fellowship may 
not satisfy the needs of all scholars.  
 
We ordered the accompanying articles to this special issue in a sequence that may help better 
understand internationalization motives and how to interpret them. First, Benito provides an 
overview of the importance of the analysis of internationalization motives in his article “Why 
and how motives (still) matter.” Second, we have two articles providing alternative 
classifications of motives, one by Cuervo-Cazurra et al. titled “Internationalization motives: 
sell more, buy better, upgrade and escape” and another by van Tulder titled “Getting all 
motives right: a holistic approach to internationalization motives of companies”. Finally, we 
have three articles providing nuanced discussions of internationalization motives, with 
Meyer’s article “What is ‘strategic asset seeking FDI’?” presenting a deep discussion of one 
of the motives; Giroud and Mirza’s article “Refining of FDI motivations by integrating global 
value chains’ considerations” explaining how global supply chains alter internationalization 
motives; and Pananond’s article “Motives for foreign direct investment: an emerging market 
multinational’s perspective” discussing how the analysis of emerging market multinationals 
modifies internationalization motives. Each of the articles provides its own contribution and 
the seven articles as a set provide a deeper understanding of internationalization motives that 
we hope will renew the interests on this topic, as well as result in additional research 
extending and improving the arguments presented in this forum.  
Notes 
1. See also Hymer (1968) which remains pretty much ignored. 
2. An earlier draft of the 1993 book included ‘trade-supportive investments as the fifth 
‘main’ motive. This version informed the 1993 doctoral thesis of Rajneesh Narula 
(later published as Narula, 1996) and is included in his dissertation as one of the five 
main motives of international production. 
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